<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Internet on Christian Spoo</title><link>https://www.christian-spoo.de/tags/internet/</link><description>Recent content in Internet on Christian Spoo</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 09:25:12 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.christian-spoo.de/tags/internet/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The night DNSSEC broke .de</title><link>https://www.christian-spoo.de/posts/2026/05/the-night-dnssec-broke-.de/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 09:00:00 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://www.christian-spoo.de/posts/2026/05/the-night-dnssec-broke-.de/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Last night, large parts of the German internet quietly broke.
Not for everyone — which made it more confusing, not less.
Bahn.de, Spiegel.de, and thousands of other &lt;code&gt;.de&lt;/code&gt; domains returned &lt;code&gt;SERVFAIL&lt;/code&gt; to anyone using a security-conscious DNS resolver.
The culprit was DENIC, the registry responsible for the &lt;code&gt;.de&lt;/code&gt; top-level domain, and a botched key rollover in their DNSSEC setup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="what-dnssec-is-supposed-to-do"&gt;What DNSSEC is supposed to do&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DNS — the system that translates domain names like &lt;code&gt;spiegel.de&lt;/code&gt; into IP addresses — was designed in an era when the internet was a considerably more trusting place.
It has no built-in mechanism to verify that the answers you receive are genuine and haven&amp;rsquo;t been tampered with in transit.
An attacker positioned between you and your DNS resolver can, in principle, return fake records and silently redirect you to a malicious server.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>